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Abstract
Calculation of likelihood ratios (LR) in evidence evaluation still presents major chal-
lenges in many forensic disciplines: for instance, an incorrect selection of databases,
a bad choice of statistical models, low quantity and bad quality of the evidence are
factors that may lead to likelihood ratios supporting the wrong proposition in a
given case. However, measuring performance of LR values is not straightforward,
and adequate metrics should be defined and used. With this objective, in this work
we describe the concept of calibration, a property of a set of LR values. We highlight
that some desirable behavior of LR values happens if they are well calibrated. More-
over, we propose a tool for representing performance, the Empirical Cross-Entropy
(ECE) plot, showing that it can explicitly measure calibration of LR values. We
finally describe some examples using speech evidence, where the usefulness of ECE
plots and the measurement of calibration is shown.
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1 Introduction
Despite the increasing acceptance of the likelihood ratio (LR) approach of
evidence evaluation in forensic science [1], computation of LR values still re-
mains a challenge. There are many factors that may lead to values of the LR
supporting the wrong proposition in a case, an effect known as misleading evi-
dence [2]. If this happens, the LR values are said to present bad performance.
Those factors may include sparsity of the databases used as populations [3,4],
mismatch in the conditions of the elements in the population databases and
in the evidence [5,6], degraded quality or quantity of the evidential materials
[7–9], and so forth.
Good performance of the LR is essential in casework. Otherwise, misleading
LR values in court may lead fact finders to wrong decisions. This idea is the
main motivation behind the establishment of validation procedures for evi-
dence evaluation methods, as a way to establish procedures to control and
allow the use of LR models in casework. These validation procedures of evi-
dence evaluation methods should be based on a careful process of performance
measurement.
Motivated by this critical problem, in this work we adopt a methodology for
the measurement of performance of LR methods in forensic science based on
so-called Strictly Proper Scoring Rules (SPSR) [10–12] that has solid grounds
on Bayesian statistics. The main contribution of this work is highlighting the
importance of a property of a set of LR values called calibration, and its
relationship with the desirable behavior that the LR should have. Also, al-
though the SPSR methodology is not new, we adapt it to the LR framework
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for forensic evaluation inference; and we describe a useful representation of
the performance of LR values in terms of SPSR and calibration: the Empir-
ical Cross-Entropy (ECE) plot. This methodology for measuring calibration
is not intended to replace other methods for measuring performance of the
LR, based on e.g. Tippett plots or other measurements over the numerator
and the denominator of the LR separately. Conversely, we show in this article
that measuring the calibration of the LR is an excellent complement to all
those methods, in order to have a deep analysis of the performance of the
LR with views to a validation process of LR computation in forensic science.
In this sense, the example shown in this article illustrate the adequacy and
complementarity of using ECE plots in addition to Tippett plots.
Calibration is understood here as a property of a set of LR values, which can
be measured. Although the term calibration has been recently used to denote
a process for obtaining likelihood ratios, we do not follow that meaning in this
article. Therefore, our proposal in this article is not about methods to compute
the LR, but a methodology to measure the performance and the calibration
of a set of LR values, no matter how they were computed. Thus, LR values
can be computed using e.g. widely accepted models which assign probabilities
separately to the numerator and the denominator of the LR (such as the ones
described in [13]), and the calibration of the LR values can be measured for
those LR values using the methodology proposed in this article.
The article is organized as follows. First, we present the performance assess-
ment methodology based on SPSR, particularizing in the classical example of
weather forecasting. Then, we intuitively define and describe the concept of
calibration. After that, we give reasons that reveal that it is not straightfor-
ward to directly apply this methodology to forensic science, and we describe
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the ECE plot as a solution to overcome those difficulties. Finally, we present
experimental examples in forensic speaker recognition where the properties
of well-calibrated likelihood ratios are highlighted, after which we draw some
conclusions.
2 Measuring performance of probabilistic assessments
In this work, we start by adopting a methodology for measuring performance
based on Strictly Proper Scoring Rules (SPSR) [10,12], which is not new and
has been studied for decades in Bayesian statistics. We begin with a classical
example that has motivated abundant research: the elicitation of probabilistic
assessments for weather forecasting [14,11].
2.1 Probabilistic Weather Forecasting
Consider an unknown variable, say θ, whose value we want to know. Let θ be
binary, which means that it only can take one out of 2 values: either θ = θp
or θ = θd
1 . In the weather forecasting example we are going to assume that
the unknown variable θ refers to a particular day in the future. We therefore
denote θ(i) as the corresponding variable θ for day i. Thus, in that context the
values of θ(i) ∈ {θp, θd}, with the following meaning for day i:
• θp: it rains in day i.
• θd: it does not rain in day i.
1 We adopt this notation intentionally, because we ultimately aim at the forensic
inference problem
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A probabilistic weather forecaster, or simply a forecaster, is defined as some-
one who assigns probabilities for θ(i) = θp or θ
(i) = θd before the value of θ
(i) is
known, aiming at predicting its value. The mechanism by which the forecaster
assigns probabilities does not need to be known, but it can be said that, as
any other probabilistic assignment, it must consider all the knowledge avail-
able to the forecaster, say K [15]. The probability that θ(i) = θp given K is
then denoted as P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K) which, in words of the forecaster, should be
read the probability that it rains in day i in the future, given all my available
knowledge K. We denote K, the available knowledge, as an observed value, in
the sense that it is known and fixed. It may include the education, experience
and preferences of the forecaster; some data in which the forecaster is basing
their assessment; a statistical model; etc. All the resources that are known
to the forecaster and used in some way for the elicitation of the probabilistic
forecast are included in K, no matter their origin.
For simplicity and convenience, we will eliminate the reference to the day
i from the notation when it is clear from the context. Therefore, in those
cases we will denote θ(i) ≡ θ and P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K) ≡ P (θp|K). Moreover, by
definition of θp and θd, both values have to be complementary, i.e., P (θp|K) =
1− P (θd|K).
We assume that at the end of day i the actual value of θ(i) in day i and all
past days will be known. In other words, at the end of the current day the fact
of whether it rained or not in any day in the past will be known. Thus, the
forecaster will elicit forecasts for future days from day i, when θ is actually
unknown.
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Notice that P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K) denotes a probability of the value of the variable
of interest (θ) given all the available, observed knowledge K. In Bayesian
inference, this is known as a posterior probability, and therefore probabilistic
weather forecasters assign posterior probabilities.
2.2 Performance of Probabilistic Assessments: Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
During decades, Bayesian statisticians have been seriously concerned about
the elicitation of probabilistic assessments [10,16,17], which can be understood
given the Bayesian interpretation of probability as a degree of belief [18,19]. In
this topic of research, one of the main questions under study has always been
the performance of the probabilistic assessments, that can be summarized as
follows: if someone is eliciting probability assessments (according to a given
model and data, or based on personal experience), how can we evaluate how
they perform?
Contextualizing to our weather forecasting example, we can get some intuition
about how to evaluate the performance of one single probabilistic assessment
of the forecaster. Imagine that the forecaster assigns a probability of raining
for tomorrow (day i) as P (θp|K) = 0.9. Then, after two days it turns out
that it did actually rain in day i, i.e. θ = θp. As the probability given by
the forecaster to the value of θ that actually occured (θp) is fairly high, then
for that particular probabilistic assessment the forecaster did a good work.
Therefore, if an external evaluator would assign a cost (or penalty) to that
particular forecast, that penalty should be low. However, if the forecaster
would have assigned P (θp|K) = 0.1, then that forecast would not have been
a good one, since the probability for what it actually happened (it rained,
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θp) would have been low. These examples suggest that, in order to evaluate a
single forecast, two elements are needed: the probability distribution of θ as
assigned by the forecaster (the probability of rain in day i, P (θp|K)), and
the actual value of the variable θ, that was unknown by the forecaster, but it
is known when performance is to be measured.
According to this intuition in Bayesian statistics the performance of proba-
bilistic assessments has been classically addressed by the use of Strictly Proper
Scoring Rules (SPSR) [10–12]. A SPSR is a function both of a probability dis-
tribution assigned to a given unknown variable, and the actual value of the
variable. The value of the SPSR will be interpreted as a loss or a cost given
to the probability distribution depending on the actual value of the variable.
In this work we will use the logarithmic SPSR, which is defined as follows 2 :
C (P (θp|K) , θ) =


− log2 (P (θp|K)) if θ = θp;
− log2 (1− P (θp|K)) if θ = θd.
(1)
where C (P (θp|K) , θ) represents the SPSR as a function of P (θp|K) and
the actual value of θ. The intuition behind SPSR will be exemplified with
the representation of the logarithmic SPSR in Figure 1. The figure shows
the two possible values of the logarithmic SPSR depending on the actual
value of θ, as a function of P (θd|K). According to Equation 1, if θ = θp (it
actually rained in day i), the SPSR assigns a high penalty to low values of
2 There are strong reasons to prefer the logarithmic scoring rule to other SPSR,
but they are out of the scope of this work, see [20,21] for details. The base of the
logarithm is irrelevant for the expositions. We use base-2 logarithms for information-
theoretical reasons, that are explained in [22].
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P (θd|K), and vice-versa. This corresponds to the fact that, if the weather
forecaster expressed a high probability of rain in day i (high P (θd|K)), and
it actually rained (θ = θp), then the penalty should be low, and vice-versa. In
the limit, if the forecaster expressed a categorical probability of P (θd|K) =
0 (i.e., it is impossible that tomorrow it will rain), and it actually rained,
the penalty will be infinite for the logarithmic SPSR 3 . From Figure 1, an
analogous reasoning can be followed for the case where θ = θd (it did not rain
in day i), where forecasts expressing high probability of rain (high P (θd|K))
are severely penalized by the logarithmic SPSR, and vice-versa.
Stricly Proper Scoring Rules measure the goodness of a single forecast from
the forecaster. However, an overall performance of a given set of forecasts
from a given forecaster should be given. In order to do that, we will firstly
need a set of forecasts from the forecaster, with their corresponding actual
values of θ for each forecast in the set. We denote the latter the ground-truth
labels. The whole set of forecasts with their corresponding ground-truth labels
will be denoted a validation set of posterior probabilities. In the context of
weather forecasting, the validation set of posterior probabilities can be drawn
from an archive of past forecasts from a given forecaster, and the ground-truth
labels can be obtained from weather databases where registries of whether it
rained those days or not will be available. We use the term validation for
this set because we assume that the measurement of performance will lead
to a validation process where it will be decided whether or not something or
someone should be valid for their purpose. In our weather forecaster example,
3 This is, in fact, one desirable property of the logarithmis SPSR, if it is assumed
that someone who categorically expresses a wrong judgement should be the worst
possible forecaster.
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Fig. 1. Representation of the logarithmic Strictly Proper Scoring Rule.
the validation process would yield a decision of whether a given forecaster is
valid for a given task or not.
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In order to measure the accuracy of a validation set of posterior probabilities
from the forecaster, the following procedure has been proposed [11]:
LC = −
1
Np
∑
θ(i)=θp
log2
[
P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K)]− 1
Nd
∑
θ(j)=θd
log2
[
1− P
(
θ(j) = θp
∣∣∣K)]
(2)
where LC is the accuracy of the validation set of posterior probabilities, and Np
and Nd are the number of forecasts where θ is respectively θp or θd. Roughly
speaking, for the wheather forecaster example, the accuracy of the valida-
tion set is the average of the SPSR for the days where it rained, namely
− 1
Np
∑
θ(i)=θp
log2
[
P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K)]; plus the average of the SPSR for the days
where it did not rain, namely − 1
Nd
∑
θ(j)=θd
log2
[
1− P
(
θ(j) = θp
∣∣∣K)].
2.3 Interpretation as Accuracy
Accuracy is defined as the closeness of a given magnitude to its true value. We
illustrate the accuracy interpretation of LC in Equation 2 as follows. We define
a perfect or oracle forecaster as the one who assigns probability distributions
to θ each day in the light of the true value of θ. Thus, such an oracle forecaster
assigns P (θp|K) = 1 if θ = θp and P (θp|K) = 0 if θ = θd. For each forecast,
the accuracy of the oracle forecaster will be the best possible, and because of
that we call it perfect accuracy. Also, the SPSR for the oracle forecaster would
be always 0 (see Equation 1 and Figure 1). For a forecaster that is not the
oracle one, the true value of θ will be unknown for a given day i, and therefore
their forecast P (θp|K) will not present perfect accuracy as explained before.
Then, the penalty assigned by the SPSR depends on the deviation of the non-
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perfect forecaster from the behavior of the oracle forecaster, and therefore the
latter it is a measure of the accuracy for the given forecast.
There are other desirable properties of SPSR as measures of accuracy that
are out of the scope of this article. Interested readers will find an appropriate
formal introduction to the topic in [10,12].
2.4 Calibration
The so-called property of calibration of a set of probabilistic assessments has
been extensively studied in the past by Bayesian statisticians [14,11]. An intu-
itive definition of calibration can be reproduced from [16] in the same context
as in our weather forecaster example:
[...] If the metheorologist is using the scale properly, however, we would
expect that rain would occur in two-thirds of the days to which he assigns
a rain probability of 2/3. This criterion is called calibration [...].
Considering our notation, calibration can be defined as follows. If a fore-
caster elicits probabilistic assessments about raining in some days, namely
P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K) with i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, then, for all probabilistic assessments
for which P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K) = p the proportion of days where θ = θp will be p.
This definition is only useful if it is possible to compute proportions of cases
where θp is true in the validation set of posterior probabilities for each of
the value of such probabilities. That is generally possible if the values of the
probabilities that the forecaster can assign is discrete (as it happens in [11]).
If the forecaster can elicit any continuous value in the [0, 1] range, then the
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definition should consider some kind of partition (or binning) of such a range.
Then, we can say that a set of probabilistic assessments is well calibrated 4 if,
for all assessments P
(
θ(i) = θp
∣∣∣K) with their values within a region (or bin)
defined by p±∆, with ∆ not too large, the proportion of cases where θ = θp
is close to p.
According to the definition of calibration, we can visualize whether the calibra-
tion of a set of probabilistic assessments is good or bad by means of so-called
empirical calibration plots. Figure 2(b) shows one of this plots. It represents
a histogram of the proportion of cases where it actually rained with respect
to the total number of cases, as a function of the value of the probabilistic
assessment. For the sake of illustration, in Figure 2(a) the histograms of the
probabilistic assessments in the set respectively when θ = θp and when θ = θd
are represented. Notice that the empirical calibration plot in Figure 2(b) is
obtained by bin-by-bin dividing the number of cases in the histogram where
θ = θp over the total number of cases in both histograms in Figure 2(a).
Thus, in the empirical calibration plot, for all the days where the probabilistic
assessment of the forecaster fell into a given range of values in the x-axis (i.e.
a given bin), the y-axis represents the proportion of days where it actually
rained. From the definition of calibration, for a well-calibrated set of proba-
bilistic assessments, the value of the x- and y-axes should tend to be equal,
and then the x = y line is represented in the empirical calibration plot. Figure
2 shows an example of a well calibrated validation set of probabilities, whereas
4 Notice that, due to this definition of calibration for continuous probabilistic as-
sessments, calibration is not treated as something that is present or absent. Con-
versely, calibration is used as a continuous metric, and we will rather talk about
probabilistic assessments that are well calibrated or badly calibrated.
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Fig. 2. Well-calibrated set of posterior probabilities. (a): Histograms of probabilities
when θ = θp (top) and when θ = θd (bottom). (b): Empirical calibration plot.
a badly-calibrated set is represented in Figure 3.
Some of the good properties of calibration can be guessed intuitively now:
if a forecaster elicits well-calibrated probabilistic assessments, they will be
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Fig. 3. Badly-calibrated set of posterior probabilities. (a): Histograms of probabili-
ties when θ = θp (top) and when θ = θd (bottom). (b): Empirical calibration plot.
constraining their opinions to the actual proportion of occurrence of events, a
behavior that seems reasonable according to [16].
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2.5 Calibration and Discriminating Power
In the context of weather forecasting, we define the discriminating power of a
set of posterior probabilities as the ability to distinguish between days where
it will rain (θ = θp) and days where it will not rain (θ = θp). Discriminat-
ing power is also seen as the ability of the probability assessments to give
information about the true value of θ. An example of a set of probabilities
presenting good discriminating power is the one represented in the histograms
in Figure 2(a), where it can be seen that the forecasts in days where it rains
tend to be higher than the forecasts in days where it does not rain. Thus, a
single forecast in that set of probabilities will give information about whether
tomorrow it will rain or not, because if it is high, it will tend to indicate that
in the following day it will rain, and vice-versa.
Although calibration has been described as a desirable property, a set of pos-
terior probabilities needs not only to be well calibrated, but also to be dis-
criminating. We exemplify this as follows:
• It is possible that a well-calibrated set of posterior probabilities would give
little or no information about the value of θ. For instance, a weather fore-
caster assigning well-calibrated forecasts can be useless in order to determine
whether I should take my umbrella or not before going out. An example is
a weather forecaster that is eliciting probabilities about raining in a re-
gion where the average probability of rain is 50%, and they always assign
P (θp|K) = 0.5. In the long-term, they will be well calibrated, because for
the forecasts of value 0.5, the proportion of cases where it rains is 0.5, the
average proportion of rainy days. However, such a forecaster does not give
15
any information whatsoever about whether it will rain or not in a given day,
and therefore I will obtain no advice in any day about whether I have to
take my umbrella with me or not. In other words, the forecaster does not
give any information about the value of θ, the variable of interest, and they
are useless in this sense. This type of forecaster is said to present no discrim-
inating power in order to distinguish between days where it rains or not,
but on the other hand they assign extremely well-calibrated probabilities in
the long-term. Such a forecaster is represented in Figure 4.
• Even a forecaster that perfectly separates days in which it rains or not
can be badly calibrated. We say that such a forecaster presents perfect dis-
criminating power. For instance, imagine a weather forecaster that assigned
probabilistic assessments during a period of time in a way that all the days
where it actually rained the probability of rain was 0.6, and all the days
where it actually did not rain the probability of rain was 0.4. The forecaster
had the ability of perfectly separating the days where θ = θp (with proba-
bity of 0.6 for all of them) and the days where θ = θd (with probabity of
0.4 for all of them), and therefore the forecaster presented perfect discrim-
inating power in that period of time. However, those forecasts seem quite
imperfect, because if the forecaster has such an amazing ability, a stronger
opinion (i.e., respectively closer to probability of 1 or 0) would have been
more convincing in order to decide if I have to take my umbrella or not
that day. Thus, even with perfect discriminating power, the forecaster is
not assigning the best possible probabilities for my decision of taking my
umbrella. Such a set of posterior probabilities is represented in Figure 5,
where the empirical calibration plot shows bad calibration.
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Fig. 4. A set of posterior probabilities showing null discriminating power but perfect
calibration. (a): Histograms of probabilities when θ = θp (top) and when θ = θd
(bottom). (b): Empirical calibration plot.
2.6 Calibration and Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
From our previous descriptions, now we can measure the accuracy of a set of
probabilistic assessments by means of average values of SPSR (see Equation
17
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Fig. 5. A set of posterior probabilities showing perfect discriminating power but bad
calibration. (a): Histograms of probabilities when θ = θp (top) and when θ = θd
(bottom). (b): Empirical calibration plot.
2). Additionally, we have introduced two desirable properties of the set of
probabilities: calibration and discriminating power. The question is are these
two properties related to our definition of accuracy?
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The answer to the former question is yes, and was given by [20,21] in relation
to the work in [11]. In those works, it is shown that:
LC = L
disc
C + L
cal
C (3)
where LC is the average cost or penalty due to a lack of accuracy of the set of
posterior probabilities (Equation 2), LdiscC is the fraction of this average cost
due to a lack of discrimination, and LcalC is the fraction of the average cost due
to a lack of calibration. Thus, by means of this decomposition, the accuracy
of a set of forecasts will be good if and only if the discriminating power and
the calibration of the probabilities are also both of them good.
Exemplifying in our weather forecasting example, we understand that a fore-
caster is accurate if their predictions allow us to efficiently decide whether
to take an umbrella or not a given day. As we highlighted in Section 2.5, if
the discriminating power of the probabilities elicited by the forecaster is good
and their calibration is bad, then the accuracy can be very bad, because the
forecaster can be under-confident or even biased in their probabilistic assess-
ments, and our decision about the umbrella can be incorrect because of those
reasons. On the other hand, if the calibration is good but the discriminating
power is bad, we will probably have a forecaster that assigns so weak proba-
bilistic assessments that give us little information about whether tomorrow it
will rain or not, and therefore accuracy will be also poor because we will not
find them useful in our decision about taking an umbrella or not.
The decomposition in Equation 3 allows to explicitly measuring calibration
as the average cost given by LcalC : the lower the value of L
cal
C , the better the
19
calibration, and vice-versa. However, arriving to such a decomposition is not
trivial. We have adopted the solution proposed in [20,21] by means of the Pool
Adjacent Violators algorith (PAV). As described in [20,21,23], PAV receives
as an input a validation set of posterior probabilities 5 , and a new probability
is assigned to each of the posterior probabilities of the input set, yielding a
set of optimally-calibrated posterior probabilities. Thus, if the accuracy of the
set of posterior probabilities before the application of PAV is LC, then the
accuracy of the set after the application of PAV will be LdiscC , because the
calibration loss of the probabilities transformed by PAV LcalC will be reduced
to zero. Therefore, if we have a validation set of posterior probabilities, we can
measure the following magnitudes:
• Accuracy, the global measure of performance of the set, as the average value
of the SPSR, namely LC (Equation 2).
• Discriminating power, as the accuracy of the set after being transformed by
the PAV algorithm, namely LdiscC .
• Calibration, as LcalC = LC −L
disc
C .
It is important to highlight here that the use of PAV in the proposed method-
ology aims at establishing just a reference of performance. In this article, we
are not proposing PAV as a method for computing LR values. Thus, a set
of LR values can be computed using common LR computation methods (e.g.
such as the ones described in [13]), and then the LR values obtained can be
compared to the reference LR values obtained by the application of PAV. See
also [24] for details.
5 Notice that the ground truth labels are also in the validation set.
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3 Probabilistic Assessments in Forensic Science
In many aspects, the Bayesian probabilistic framework in forensic science is
analogous to the one described above for weather forecasting. However, al-
though it is possible to apply the assessment methodology described above
to forensic science, the steps are not straightforward. We need to take into
account the particular inferential context of forensic interpretation and the
competences and roles involved, in order to arrive to a satisfactory solution,
that we develop in this section.
3.1 The Likelihood Ratio Approach
In order to understand the problems arising from the use of the SPSR method-
ology in forensic science, it is needed that we get deeper into the Bayesian in-
ferential mechanism in forensic science, namely the LR framework for forensic
evidence evaluation [13].
Consider the forensic evidence E, which includes two types of evidential ma-
terials : recovered materials of unknown origin and control materials whose
origin is known. Such so-called alternative propositions can be stated at sev-
eral levels [25,26]. An example of a pair of propositions at source level is:
• θp (also known as the prosecution proposition): the recovered and control
materials come from the same source.
• θd (also known as the defence proposition, or the alternative proposition):
the recovered materials come from a population of potential sources, which
does not include the source of the control materials.
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In a forensic case, the unobserved variable of interest is the proposition that is
actually true in the case, namely θ, which may take the values θp or θd. Bayes’
theorem relates probabilities of the values of θ before and after the analysis
of the evidence:
P (θp |E, I)
P (θd |E, I)
= LR×
P (θp | I)
P (θd | I)
(4)
where I is the background information available in the case apart from the
evidence E. The propositions must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive 6 .
Equation 4 is the so-called odds form of Bayes’ theorem, because the odds O
are defined as O (θp |E, I) =
P (θp |E,I)
P (θd |E,I)
. The likelihood ratio (LR) is therefore
defined as:
LR =
P (E| θp, I)
P (E| θd, I)
(5)
and expresses the degree of support given by the evidence to any of the propo-
sitions in the case.
From Equations 4 and 5, the relationship between the posterior probability
that θ = θp and the LR value can be stated as:
6 Although in this work we assume that the propositions fulfill both requirements,
some authors do not consider exhaustion as a strict requirement. For instance, in
[27] when the propositions are not exhaustive but the probability of any of them to
be true is close to 1, they define pseudo-odds as a way of performing the inferential
process
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P (θp|E, I) =
LR× O (θp)
1 + LR × O (θp)
(6)
It is important to highlight here that in casework the forensic examiner should
assess the value of the LR, but not the value of the prior probabilities. This
is the one of the main advantages of the use of likelihood ratios: in a given
case, the fact finder evaluates all the possible information but the evidence,
whose strength is contributed by the forensic examiner by the reporting of
a LR. In this way, the forensic examiner should not need to assess the prior
probabilities in casework.
3.2 Weather Forecasting and Forensic Science
In order to apply in forensic science the performance assessment methodology
based on SPSR, we establish some analogies between the previously described
weather forecasting example and the forensic inference framework:
• The binary variable of interest, θ(i) ≡ θ. In weather forecasting, its value
indicates if it rained or not in day i. In forensic inference, its value indicates
the proposition (prosecution or defence) that is true in a given case indexed
as i.
• The possible values of θ. In weather forecasting, θp means that it rained in
day i and θd means that it did not rain in day i. In forensic inference, θp
means that the prosecution proposition is true in case i and θd means that
the defence proposition is true in case i.
• The available knowledge. In weather forecasting, all the knowledge available
to the forecaster is referred to as K. In forensic inference, all the available
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knowledge is split into E and I. If we understand these as sets, we can
define K ≡ E ∪ I for forensic inference, and K would have an analogous
meaning than in weather forecasting: all the available observed knowledge
in the problem.
• The assessment of probabilities. Given the analogies above, we can state the
problem of forensic inference in the same terms as in weather forecasting.
On the one hand, the aim of the weather forecaster is assigning a posterior
probability distribution P (θp |K) that represents their opinion about the
value of the unknown variable θ, from the information obtained from K. On
the other hand, in forensic inference the aim of the fact finder is obtaining a
posterior probability distribution P (θp |E, I) that represents their opinion
about the value of θ from the information obtained from the evidence E
and the rest of iformation in the case I.
Despite all the analogies before, using the methodology of performance assess-
ment based on SPSR in forensic science is not straightforward, because there is
a substantial difference with respect to the weather forecasting example. And
that difference comes from what we want to measure in forensic evaluation of
the evidence.
In weather forecasting, we wanted to measure the performance of the proba-
bilistic assessments of the forecaster, namely P (θp |K). As the responsible of
such assessments is the forecaster, then we can measure performance directly
from a validation set of posterior probabilities assigned by the forecaster (and
their corresponding ground-truth labels).
However, in the case of forensic inference, this is not the case, for several
reasons:
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• In forensic inference we only want to measure the performance of the proba-
bilistic assessments of the forensic examiner. Therefore, we want to focus on
measuring the performance of the LR, not the performance of the posterior
probability P (θp |E, I). This is because the posterior probability depends
both on the LR and on the prior probability P (θp | I), the latter not be-
ing the province of the forensic examiner. However, the SPSR framework
is based on measuring the performance of the posterior probabilities, and
therefore if we apply it directly to forensic science, we would be partially
measuring performance of the assessments of the fact finder, not just the
LR given by the forensic examiner.
• It is currently unrealistic to imagine a scenario where fact finders assign
prior probabilities in a Bayesian context. Thus, it may not be possible in
general to arrive to posterior probabilities in a case, and therefore the SPSR
methodology could not be applied to measure performance of posterior prob-
abilities in a realistic scenario.
• The measurement of the performance of the methods is typically conducted
in the forensic laboratories, by means of simulated experiments where the
evidence evaluation methods are tested empirically. This is typically done
before deciding whether a method is ready to be used in casework or not.
As the forensic examiner cannot assign prior probabilities, it is not straight-
forward to arrive to posterior probabilities from the values of LR that may
be computed in those simulated experiments.
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4 Measuring Accuracy in Forensic Science
Despite all the reasons given in the previous section, we give a solution that
allows the use of the SPSR assessment methodology to LR values computed
by forensic examiners.
4.1 Avoiding the Prior Odds in Performance Measurement
Imagine that we work in a forensic laboratory where we want to assess the
performance of a given LR computation method. In order to apply the SPSR
methodology, our proposed solution firstly considers the set-up of a simulated
experiment, where a validation set of LR values will be computed from a so-
called validation database. Each LR value from such a validation set, say LRi,
would be generated by the simulation of a case, say case i, where the evi-
dential materials Ei (control and recovered) will be taken from the validation
database. The experimental protocol considers that several values of LR are
computed following this procedure, each one by means of a different simulated
case. As the ground-truth labels are known in the validation database, we can
follow a comparison protocol that yields a number Np of LR values from sim-
ulated cases where we know that θp is actually true, and a number Nd of LR
values from simulated cases where we know that θd is true. Summarizing, the
validation set of LR values will consist of the set of N = Np +Nd LR values
with their corresponding ground-truth labels.
It is important to remark that if any of these LR values would have been
computed in a real case, the forensic scientist should report the LR value to
court, but not accompanied by any assessment of prior probabilities [25], and
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not usurping the role of the court and reporting a posterior probability (a
phenomenon that is called the prosecutor’s fallacy [28]).
However, measuring performance by SPSR is focused on posterior probabili-
ties, but forensic examiners only have the values of the LR in the validation
set. If a value of the prior would be fixed in the experiment, a validation set of
posterior probabilities could be obtained from that prior and the LR values,
and those posteriors could be used to assess accuracy with the SPSR method-
ology. In that case, we would be measuring performance for the particular
case when the fact finder would set the prior to that given value. However,
the forensic examiner cannot fix a value of the prior, even in their experiment,
because that value is not their competence.
Instead of that, we propose to compute accuracy in our experiment for a wide
range of prior probabilities, following the same procedure as in [20]. That way,
in the experiment, we vary the prior probabilities, and we compute what would
be the accuracy when we use the validation set of LR values for each of the
the prior probabilities in that range. Thus, the forensic examiner will not fix
a value for the prior probabilities in the experiment, but they will be able to
know the performance (accuracy) if someone would be using their LR values
in a correct Bayesian framework.
Notice the differences we establish between the use of a LR in casework and
our proposed procedure to measure performance of a set of LR values in a con-
trolled experiment, typically prior to casework. First, in casework the ground
truth is unknown, but in the controlled experiment the ground-truth labels
are available. Second, in casework it is totally unrealistic to think that the fact
finder will be assessing a prior probability, at least in current practice. How-
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ever, the duty of our methodology for measuring performance is to consider
the LR in a formal way, as part of a Bayesian inference process. Therefore, in
our experiment, we assume that the fact finder will assess a prior, but we will
never know its particular value. This is the reason to consider a wide range of
prior probabilities, and not a particular value of the prior.
4.2 Proposed Performance Representation: ECE plots
Following the procedure described in the previous section, we propose a way of
representing the performance of a set of LR values, which measures accuracy
as an explicit decomposition between discriminating power and calibration. It
is out of the scope of this work to go into deep details, that can be found in
[24,22].
First, we define our measure of accuracy, namely Empirical Cross-Entropy
(ECE) as the average value of the logarithmic scoring rule, weighted in the
following way:
ECE =−
P (θp| I)
Np
∑
θ(i)=θp
log2 P (θp|Ei, I)
−
P (θd| I)
Nd
∑
θ(j)=θd
log2 P (θd|Ej , I). (7)
where Ei and Ej denote the evidence in each of the comparisons (cases) in the
validation set where θp or θd are respectively true. It is illustrating to express
ECE explicitly in terms of the prior odds and the LR using Equations 6 and
7:
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ECE =
P (θp| I)
Np
∑
θ(i)=θp
log2
(
1 +
1
LRi ×O (θp)
)
+
P (θd| I)
Nd
∑
θ(j)=θd
log2 (1 + LRi × O (θp)). (8)
As it can be seen in Equations 7 and 8, the averages in ECE are weighted by the
value of the prior probabilities. This weighting allows ECE to be interpreted in
an information-theoretical way, but this topic is out of the scope of this work
(see [24,22] for details). However, it can be shown that the interpretation of
ECE as accuracy and its properties related to calibration remain the same as
for LC (see, e.g., [21]).
Equation 8 shows that ECE depends on the validation set of LR values in the
experiment (i.e., the LR values and their corresponding ground-truth labels).
However, ECE also depends on the value of the prior odds O (θp| I), since a
SPSR depends on the posterior probabilities. Thus, following the procedure
described in Section 4.1 ECE can be represented as a function of the logarithm
of the prior odds. An example of such a representation can be seen in Figure 6.
We use base-10 logarithms for the prior odds because they are typically used
for evidence evaluation. However, base-2 logarithms will be used for computa-
tion of ECE because of its information-theoretical interpretation (see [24,22]
and [29] for details).
ECE in Figure 6 represents the accuracy for all the possible values of the prior
probability, but calibration is not explicitly represented. Therefore, we give an
explicit measurement of discriminating power and calibration in a so-called
ECE plot ([24]), which shows three comparative performance curves together
(Figure 7):
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Fig. 6. ECE as a function of the logarithm of the prior odds (prior log-odds).
(1) Solid curve: accuracy. This curve is the ECE of the LR values in the
validation set, as a function of the prior log-odds. The lower this curve,
the better the accuracy. This is the same representation as shown in
Figure 6.
(2) Dashed curve: accuracy after PAV. This curve is the ECE of the validation
set of LR values after being transformed using the PAV algorithm, as a
function of the prior log-odds. Therefore, this shows the performance of
a validation set of optimally-calibrated LR values, according to Section
2.5 7 .
(3) Dotted curve: neutral reference. It represents the comparative perfor-
mance of a so-called neutral evidence evaluation method, defined as the
one which always delivers LR=1 for each case. This neutral method is
taken as a performance bound: the accuracy should be always better than
7 Recall that PAV is used in the proposed methodology as a reference for measuring
performance, and not as a method of obtaining LR values in casework.
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Fig. 7. Example of an ECE plot.
the neutral reference.
Thus, in ECE plots we can observe the following:
• Accuracy: solid curve. The lower the curve, the better the accuracy.
• Discriminating power: dashed curve. The lower the curve, the better the
discriminating power.
• Calibration: difference between the solid and dashed curves. The closer the
blue and the red curves, the better the calibration.
With this representation, the calibration of a validation set of LR values can
be explicitly measured.
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4.3 Software tools for drawing ECE plots
In order to facilitate the use of these tools, there is a freely available software
for the computation of ECE plots for Octave and MatlabTM , that can be down-
loaded from http://atvs.ii.uam.es/software/ECE plots SW.zip. Moreover, the
R package comparison by David Lucy also includes functions for drawing
ECE plots, and can be downloaded from the CRAN repository (http://cran.r-
project.org).
An example of the use of the software in MatlabTM is shown as follows, where
it can be seen that with the LR values separated in the cases where θp and θd
are respectively true, it is easy to use the software to draw ECE plots:
>> figureS1=ECE_plot_10({’Example ECE plot’,{logLRss1,logLRds1}});
>> % Variables (two vectors) containing the LR values:
>> % logLRss1: LR where prosecutor proposition is true
>> % logLRds1: LR where defence proposition is true
5 Why reliable? A Desirable Property of Well-calibrated Likeli-
hood Ratios
Until now, we have been focusing on describing and explaining the concept of
calibration, an we have provided tools to measure accuracy and calibration.
In this section, we justify why a set of LR values should be well calibrated, by
means of an important property of calibration: for a well-calibrated set of LR
values, the higher their discriminating power, the stronger the support they
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will tend to yield, and vice-versa. In other words, if we have a method that
yields well-calibrated LR values which also present high discriminating power,
the weight of the evidence given by that method, expressed as the value of
|log (LR)|, will tend to be high, and vice-versa 8 .
We illustrate this property with an example. Figure 8 shows the Tippett plots
of two validation sets of LR values, namely set S1 and set S2. In the y-axis
Tippett plots represent the proportion of cases where the log10(LR) exceeds
the value in the x-axis in the experimental set. Moreover, two curves are
represented: one for the LR values in the set where θ = θp, and one for the LR
values in the set where θ = θd (see e.g. [31] for details about Tippett plots).
These two validation sets of LR values have been generated synthetically for
the sake of illustration.
From the Tippett plots, one can figure out what is the range of LR values
in each of the sets S1 and S2, because the curves represent an empirical cu-
mulative distribution of the LR values in the set. Thus, as a rule of thumb,
the further are the curves from the value of log10 (LR) = 0, the higher the
value of |log10 (LR)|. The latter is a measure of the strength (or weight) of the
evidence, because the higher the value of |log10 (LR)| the stronger the support
of the evidence to a given proposition in the case. Therefore, Tippett plots in
Figure 8 show that the strength of the LR values in S1 tends to be much higher
than for the LR values in S2. Also, in Tippett plots the discriminating power
is measured as the vertical separation of both curves in the graph, measured
at a given value of the x− axis. Therefore, if that separation is measured e.g.
8 Although well-calibrated probabilistic assessments present other desirable prop-
erties, that are not described here for limits in the extension of this work. See [14,30]
for more details.
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at x = 0, it can be also be seen from Tippett plots that the discriminating
power of S1 is higher than the discriminating power of S2.
Also, ECE plots are represented in Figure 8. ECE plots reveal that the cal-
ibration of the LR values in S1 and S2 is good in both cases, because the
separation between the solid and dashed curves is small for both sets. This
could not be seen in Tippett plots, where calibration is not explicitly mea-
sured. Moreover, the discriminating power is better in S1 than in S2, because
the dashed curve is lower for S1. Therefore, the example illustrates that if S1
and S2 are well calibrated, the method with better discriminating power will
yield stronger support to the propositions (higher weight of the evidence, i.e.
|log10 (LR)|).
This relationship between the discriminating power and the weight of the
evidence does not necessarily happen for badly-calibrated sets of LR values. In
figure 9, the performance of two badly-calibrated LR sets is shown, namely Su1
and Su2 . ECE shows the miscalibration, because there is a considerable distance
between the solid and dashed curves in both cases. Also, the discriminating
power is better for Su1 than for S
u
2 . However, the values of |log10 (LR)| are
in most cases much higher for Su2 than for S
u
1 , and therefore the relationship
between discrimination and the magnitude of |log10 (LR)| does not hold.
This property has strong implications, mostly because it agrees with common
sense. In daily life, it seems reasonable that people expresses strong opinions
if and only if they have a considerable amount of information about what
they are talking about. As a consequence, if someone has little information
about some variable of interest, they should express a weak opinion about that
variable. For instance, for probabilistic assessments in weather forecasting, if
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Fig. 8. Example with two well-calibrated sets of LR values. ECE plots on the left
column and Tippett plots on the right column. (a): Set S1. (b): Set S2
a weather forecaster is able to gather lots of information about whether it will
rain or not, then their probabilistic assessments should be strong, close to 1
or 0. On the other hand, if a forecaster is not proficient, then the best they
can do is expressing a weak opinion, typically very close to the annual average
probability of rain.
In forensic science, imagine for instance a comparison between DNA and
speech evidence. Assume a forensic scenario where the quality of the evi-
dence and the operational conditions are good for both disciplines. It seems
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Fig. 9. Example with two badly-calibrated sets of LR values. ECE plots on the left
column and Tippett plots on the right column. (a): Set Su1 . (b): Set S
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reasonable that the current methods for computing LR values for DNA ev-
idence yield highly discriminating LR values in those conditions. Moreover,
we could also affirm that the discriminating power of LR values from DNA
models is much higher than the discriminating power obtained with a forensic
automatic speaker recognition system in those conditions [32]. Then, common
sense suggests that the strength of the evidence in DNA should be in general
much higher than the strength of LR values from forensic automatic speaker
recognition systems. If the DNA models and the speaker recognition models
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yield well-calibrated LR values, then this property will hold. In this sense,
methods yielding well-calibrated LR values will help to prevent the calcula-
tion of very strong LR values in fields where the discriminating power can be
shown to be limited.
Mainly because of the property described above, calibration has been dubbed
reliability in the context of Bayesian probabilistic assessment [14,11]. Accord-
ing to the dictionary, reliability is a property of something that can be trusted
[33]. In fact, it is also common sense that, because of this property, a prob-
abilistic assessor eliciting well-calibrated probabilities can be trusted. On the
one hand, if the probabilistic assessor is able to gather lots of information
about the variable of interest, their opinions will be strong. On the other
hand, if the assessor has little information about the value of interest, their
opinions will be weak.
The same idea of reliability can be applied to well-calibrated LR values in
forensic science. Therefore, if the LR values are discriminating, then they will
tend to be strong and therefore they will have lots to do in the final decisions
by the fact finder. However, if their discriminating power is low, the LR will
tend to be weak, and therefore the prior probabilities of the fact finder will
not suffer too much change. Thus, in general one can trust well-calibrated LR
values in the inferential process.
6 Experimental Examples
In this section we show two experimental examples in the context of speaker
recognition. The aim is to highlight the importance of calibration in the per-
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formance measurement of LR computation methods, and to exemplify the
property described in Section 5.
At is is described below, the models for LR computation used in this exper-
imental example are based on assignments of probability distributions sep-
arately to the numerator and the denominator of the LR, following other
approaches in the literature such as e.g. [34–39]. Then, the performance of the
LR computed is measured by means of the proposed methodology. Therefore,
it is again highlighted that our proposal is focused on performance measure-
ment, not on the methods for computing LR values.
6.1 Human-listener speaker recognition at NIST HASR 2010
The example is presented in the context of a bi-annual speaker recognition
evaluation conducted by the American National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). These evaluations constitute one of the most important
scientific fora in order to foster the improvement and development of auto-
matic speaker recognition technology. Participation is free, and the number of
participants increase year by year.
The first experiment presented in this section has been obtained from our
participation in NIST Human-Assisted Speaker Recognition evaluation 2010
(NIST HASR 2010). The main idea is to blindly compare the performance of
different speaker recognition systems from different participants. This is done
by consecutively conducting a given amount of comparisons of two speech
segments according to a given protocol, without knowledge of the speaker
that generated each speech segment. The aim is to obtain information about
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whether both segments belong to the same person or not. The conditions of
the speech are rather uncontrolled, presenting strong variability in the acoustic
environment, the transmission channel, the acquisition device, the emotional
state of the speaker, the dialectal variation of English, etc. Thus, the compar-
ison protocol resembles some kind of forensic scenario, with poor quality of
the recordings, and strong variability of the conditions. Once the results of the
comparisons are submitted to NIST for evaluation, the organizers make the
ground-truth labels public, and benchmark results are disseminated among
participants to reveal which systems have performed better.
The NIST HASR 2010 dataset is a subset of the NIST Speaker Recognition
Evaluation 2010 (NIST SRE 2010), the latter containing hundreds of speakers
and a number of comparisons in the range of the hundreds of thousands.
However, as opposed to the NIST SRE 2010, where only automatic means are
allowed for comparison, the NIST HASR 2010 allowed human intervention in
the comparison process. Thus, in order to make the task feasible, the NIST
HASR dataset considered a small subset of 150 comparisons.
More details about the data and protocols in NIST HASR 2010 can be found
in [40].
6.1.1 Methods to compare
Using the comparison protocol of NIST HASR 2010, we will generate two dif-
ferent validation sets of LR values for two different LR computation methods,
and we will compare them in order to illustrate ECE plots and calibration.
For both models presented, it is assumed that the evidential materials are com-
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pared in order to obtain a score sE . Then, the probability density functions of
that score under the competing propositions θp and θd will be obtained from
scores under both assumptions, obtained using suitable databases. Thus, we
will denote sp =
{
s(1)p , · · · , s
(Mp)
p
}
the set ofMp scores used to obtain the prob-
ability density function in the numerator of the LR, which will be computed
under the assumption that θp is true, i.e., comparing speech segments coming
from the same speaker. Analogously, we will denote sd =
{
s
(1)
d , · · · , s
(Md)
d
}
the set of Md scores used to obtain the probability density function in the
denominator of the LR, which will be computed under the assumption that
θd is true, i.e., comparing speech segments coming from different speakers.
The first method to compare is a fully-automatic speaker recognition system,
which outputs a score from the comparison of two speech segments, from which
a LR will be obtained. It is out of the scope of this article to deeply describe the
system, but its details can be found in [41]. From the scores of the automatic
speaker recognition system, in this article a model for LR computation is
used based on assigning probabilistic distributions to the numerator and the
denominator of the LR separately, according to a Kernel Density Function
(KDF). Formally, the model is as follows:
P (sE| θp)
P (sE | θd)
=
f (sE| sp)
f (sE | sd)
(9)
where f (sE| sp) and f (sE | sd) are probability density functions obtained with
Kernel Density Functions using Gaussian kernels with optimal kernel widths.
Details about KDF and the selection of the kernel width can be found in [42].
The second method to compare is based on a panel of 11 lay listeners not
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trained in forensic speaker recognition, and not English native speakers ei-
ther. Each of the listeners was assigned part of the 150 comparisons of the
HASR evaluation. For each comparison, each participant was plenty of time
to hear the two speech recordings to compare, and several tools were allowed
in order to assist them to do basic speech representation and analysis. Af-
ter this process, a score was given by the listener, which would be higher
than 0 as more support was given to the prosecutor proposition (θp, meaning
same-source in this case) and lower than 0 as more support was given to the
defence proposition (θd, meaning different-sources in this case). The details of
this process can be found in [40]. Then, LR values were computed according
to a Gaussian model trained with scores from comparisons using data from
past NIST evaluations (namely sp and sd). Thus, for each comparison yielding
a score sE by the listener, a LR value was computed from sE in the following
way:
P (sE | θp)
P (sE | θd)
=
f (sE| µˆp, σˆp)
f (sE | µˆd, σˆd)
(10)
where f (sE| µˆp, σˆp) and f (sE| µˆd, σˆd) are Gaussian probability density func-
tions. The parameters for the numerator are µˆp, σˆp, the sample mean and
variance of sp. The parameters for the denominator are µˆd, σˆd, the sample
mean and variance of sd
6.1.2 Results: the importance of calibration
Figure 10 shows ECE plots for the validation set of LR values for each method.
From the figure, the following can be observed:
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• It is seen that the accuracy is good for the automatic method, but not for
the human listener method. The former presents an accuracy (ECE, solid
curve) much better than the neutral reference (dotted curve). However, the
accuracy of the latter is really close to the neutral reference.
• The discriminating power of the automatic method is good, because the
dashed curve is much lower than the neutral reference. However, for the
human listeners the dashed curve is pretty close to the neutral reference,
which means that the human listeners have similar discriminating power
than a set of LR values that are all equal to 1. In other words, the LR values
computed from the human listener scores have almost no discriminating
power.
• For both methods the calibration is good, because the solid and dashed
lines are really close. According to the property described in Section 5,
this will mean that for the automatic method, the LR values will tend to
be be moderately strong, because they present moderate disrcriminating
power. However, for the human listeners, the LR values will tend to be
weak, because their discriminating power is poor.
Tippett plots in Figure 11 confirm the conclusions above concerning calibra-
tion. It is observed that for the automatic method, the ranges of the LR values
are moderate, mostly in the order of magnitude of 100 or even 1000 when the
prosecution proposition is true (and inversely between 0.001 and 0.01 when
the defence proposition is true). However, for the human listener method, the
values of the LR are very weak, with |log10 (LR)| < 1 in all cases.
From the results we can say that both methods present the desired behavior.
On the one hand, the discriminating power of the automatic method can assist
the court in their inferential process, but only moderately, because it is not so
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Fig. 10. ECE plots for the human listeners (a) and automatic (b) methods in NIST
HASR 2010 evaluation.
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Fig. 11. Tippett plots for the human listeners (solid) and automatic (dashed) meth-
ods in NIST HASR 2010 evaluation.
discriminating. However, as the discriminating power of the human listeners
is poor, the best they can do is almost not affecting the prior opinion of the
fact finder, which means a weak LR value. This desirable effect is achieved if
the LR values from the evidence evaluation methods are well calibrated.
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6.2 Automatic speaker recognition at NIST SRE 2010
In this example, we present results using the ATVS-UAM automatic speaker
recognition system used in Section 6.1.1 and deeply described in [41]. This
section presents the outcome of the participation of the ATVS group of the
Universidad Autonoma de Madrid in NIST SRE 2010.
The NIST SRE 2010 database and protocol is described as follows 9 . The task
is comparing a big amount of pairs of speaker utterances from a so-called
testing database, provided by NIST for the evaluation (and previously unre-
leased). All available speech databases from past NIST evaluations can be
used for what is called a development dataset, which includes speech data
used to build the models in the system, population data for LR computation,
and validation databases in order to test the system prior to the evaluation.
The participants must submit their results without knowing the ground-truth
labels of the comparisons and without hearing the audios, as opposed to the
previously described NIST HASR evaluation. In the results presented here,
the recordings to compare (i.e., the evidence) consisted of two utterances of
roughly 5 minutes duration each, that may come from a variety of microphone
or telephone origins. The variability of the rest of conditions is strong, com-
parable to the NIST HASR 2010 evaluation described above, and therefore it
is assumed that the comparisons in the evaluation can be as challenging as in
many forensic scenarios.
9 A complete description of the NIST SRE 2010 dataset and protocol is available
in http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/mig//tests/sre/2010/NIST SRE10 evalplan.r6.pdf
(last accessed 28 September 2012).
44
The evaluation protocol considered the comparison of roughly 6000 control
speech recordings with roughly 25000 recovered recordings. The number of
comparisons to be conducted was roughly 700000. For each of the compar-
isons, the automatic system was able to give a score in a blind way. Then, for
this article a LR was obtained from the score using the same Kernel Density
Function (KDF) model as in Section 6.1.1 (Equation 9), which assigns a prob-
ability density to the numerator and the denominator of the LR separately.
After the submission of the LR values for the evaluation, NIST released the
ground-truth labels, and the participants could check the performance of their
systems. Figure 12 shows the performance of the scores of the system submit-
ted by us, with LR values computed using the described KDF model. Perfor-
mance is represented in the form of ECE and Tippett plots. Several effects
are observed. First, since the solid and dashed curves in the ECE plot are
reasonably close, we can say that the LR values blindly submitted to the eval-
uation are well calibrated, a valuable result given the challenging nature of
the evaluation. Second, the accuracy is also good, since the red curve is much
lower than the neutral reference in a wide range of prior probabilities. This
also means that the discriminating power of the system is also good, because
the blue, dashed curve is also low. Third, the strength of the LR values is also
moderately high, confirming again that a method that yields LR values that
have good discriminating power will give strong LR values if the calibration
is also good. However, there is still some room for improvement, because the
accuracy of the method is slightly worse than the neutral reference for some
extreme values of the prior odds (lower than 10−2).
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Fig. 12. ECE plots and Tippett plots of the ATVS automatic speaker recognition
method in NIST SRE 2010. Note that the range of the x-axis in Tippett plots is
from −6 to 6.
7 Conclusions
This work has highlighted the importance of calibration as a desirable prop-
erty of likelihood ratios (LR) computed by an evidence evaluation method.46
It has also presented Empirical Cross-Entropy (ECE) plots as a valuable tool
to measure the performance of LR values, including calibration, following a
methodology based on Strictly Proper Scoring Rules from Bayesian statistics.
The proposed methodology is not intended to replace other measures of per-
formance of the LR previously proposed, but to be complementary to them,
introducing the measurement of the calibration of the LR values as a way of
improving the analysis of its performance in a validation process.
After describing some desirable properties of the LR, we have introduced cal-
ibration focusing more on intuitions rather than on complex mathematics,
showing that some of those properties are achieved if the LR values are well
calibrated. In particular, we have remarked that if the LR values present good
discriminating power, they should express strong support, and vice-versa. We
also show that this property holds if the LR values are well calibrated, but
does not have to be the case if they are badly calibrated. Some examples in
the context of forensic speaker recognition have illustrated how ECE plots are
useful to represent and measure the performance of LR values, and how LR
values present a desirable behavior if they are well calibrated.
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